In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”), Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat. 1569 (1994), codified in relevant part at 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), does not preempt state-law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers who allegedly select unsafe motor carriers. Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, 608 U.S. ___ (2026). In doing so, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023), which had held that such claims were preempted by federal law.

The case arose from a collision in Illinois. Shawn Montgomery suffered severe injuries, including the amputation of his leg, after his tractor-trailer was struck by a truck operated by Caribe Transport II, LLC. Montgomery alleged that freight broker C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., negligently selected Caribe Transport to haul freight despite information indicating that the carrier presented significant safety concerns.

According to the lawsuit, Caribe Transport held a “conditional” safety rating from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and had been cited for deficiencies involving driver qualifications, hours-of-service compliance, vehicle inspection and maintenance practices, and crash history. Montgomery alleged that those deficiencies made it reasonably foreseeable that Caribe Transport’s operations would result in a serious accident.

The issue before the Supreme Court was not whether C.H. Robinson acted negligently. Rather, the question was whether Montgomery could pursue the claim at all in light of the FAAAA’s preemption provision.

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision in Ye

The FAAAA generally preempts state laws “related to a price, route, or service” of motor carriers and brokers. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Congress enacted the statute as part of its broader effort to deregulate the trucking industry and prevent states from imposing inconsistent economic regulations on interstate transportation.

In Ye, the Seventh Circuit held that negligent hiring claims against freight brokers fall within the statute’s preemptive scope because they seek to impose state-law duties governing how brokers perform one of their core services: selecting motor carriers to transport freight.

The Seventh Circuit further held that the FAAAA’s safety exception did not preserve such claims. That exception provides that the statute “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). The Seventh Circuit concluded that negligent hiring claims against brokers were directed at broker conduct rather than motor vehicle regulation and therefore did not fall within the exception.

The Seventh Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit in holding that negligent hiring claims against brokers were preempted, while the Sixth and Ninth Circuits reached the opposite conclusion. The resulting circuit split ultimately prompted Supreme Court review.

The Supreme Court’s Analysis

Justice Amy Coney Barrett, writing for a unanimous Court, assumed without deciding that Montgomery’s negligent hiring claim would otherwise fall within the FAAAA’s preemption provision. The Court therefore focused on whether the claim was preserved by the statute’s safety exception.

The Court began by observing that “all agree that common-law duties and standards of care form part of a State’s authority to regulate safety.” The dispute, therefore, turned on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles.”

Looking to ordinary meaning and its prior decision in Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251 (2013), the Court concluded that the phrase “with respect to” means “concerning” or “regarding.” Applying that interpretation, the Court held that a claim falls within the safety exception if it concerns motor vehicles used in transportation.

The Court then applied that principle to the negligent hiring claim before it. As Justice Barrett explained, requiring a broker “to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore ‘concerns’ motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods.” Because the claim concerned motor vehicles used in transportation, it fell within the safety exception and was not preempted.

The Court rejected arguments that this interpretation would swallow the FAAAA’s preemption provision. According to the Court, the safety exception preserves only a subset of otherwise preempted claims—those involving state regulation of motor vehicle safety. State laws related to prices, routes, and services that have no relationship to safety remain preempted.

The Court also rejected arguments based on statutory structure. The brokers argued that the Court’s interpretation created tension with another FAAAA provision governing certain intrastate transportation activities. The Court acknowledged the concern but concluded that the statutory text controlled.

Justice Kavanaugh’s Concurrence

Justice Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, concurred in the judgment and joined the Court’s opinion.

Justice Kavanaugh agreed that the negligent hiring claim was not preempted, but emphasized that the issue was a closer question than the majority opinion might suggest. He noted that both the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits had identified substantial textual and structural arguments supporting preemption.

The concurrence focused primarily on the relationship between § 14501(c), which contains the safety exception, and § 14501(b), which does not. Under the Court’s interpretation, negligent hiring claims involving interstate transportation may proceed under the safety exception, while similar claims involving certain intrastate transportation activities may remain preempted.

As Kavanaugh asked: “Why would Congress permit state tort suits against brokers for arranging interstate trips but preempt state tort suits against brokers for arranging intrastate trips?” He acknowledged that the plaintiff had “no good answer to that question” and described the resulting inconsistency as a “substantial anomaly.”

Nevertheless, Kavanaugh concluded that the better reading of the statute permits negligent hiring claims against brokers. He emphasized that the FAAAA was principally an economic deregulation statute and observed that federal law imposes relatively little direct safety regulation on brokers. In his view, Congress had not clearly expressed an intent to eliminate state tort remedies against brokers who allegedly select unsafe carriers.

The Unresolved Intrastate Question

One aspect of the decision may generate future litigation. The Court interpreted § 14501(c)’s safety exception to preserve negligent hiring claims involving interstate transportation. Yet § 14501(b), which governs certain intrastate transportation activities, contains no comparable safety exception.

Both Justice Barrett and Justice Kavanaugh acknowledged the resulting tension. If the statutory text is applied literally, a negligent hiring claim arising from an interstate shipment may survive preemption under § 14501(c)(2)(A), while a similar claim involving transportation governed by § 14501(b) may remain preempted.

The Court declined to resolve that issue because § 14501(b) was not before it. As a result, questions concerning the relationship between the two provisions—and whether broker liability may differ depending upon the nature of the transportation involved—remain open.

What the Decision Does—and Does Not—Decide

The immediate effect of Montgomery is clear. Freight brokers may no longer rely on Ye for the proposition that negligent hiring claims are categorically preempted by the FAAAA. The Supreme Court’s decision effectively eliminates Ye as the controlling authority within the Seventh Circuit on broker preemption issues.

The decision is also narrower than some early commentary may suggest. Notably, the Court did not hold that negligent hiring claims fall outside the FAAAA’s preemption provision. Instead, the Court expressly assumed—without deciding—that Montgomery’s claim would otherwise be preempted and held that the safety exception preserved it. The Court therefore left unresolved whether negligent hiring claims are preempted at the first step of the analysis.

Nor did the Court attempt to define the outer boundaries of the safety exception. The decision addresses only a negligent hiring claim based on allegations that a broker selected an unsafe motor carrier. Questions involving negligent retention, negligent supervision, negligent entrustment, and other theories remain for future cases.

What Montgomery does resolve is the circuit split concerning negligent hiring claims against freight brokers and the scope of the FAAAA’s safety exception. The Court concluded that a claim alleging that a broker negligently selected an unsafe motor carrier is a claim “with respect to motor vehicles” within the meaning of § 14501(c)(2)(A). In reversing the Seventh Circuit, the Court held that such claims may proceed notwithstanding the FAAAA’s preemption provision.

As Justice Barrett acknowledged when addressing the statute’s unresolved structural tensions, “[t]he text of subsection (c)(2)(A) controls. Better to live with the mystery than to rewrite the statute.”

About Timothy M. Ravich

Timothy M. Ravich concentrates his practice in the areas of aviation, product, and general civil litigation. Recognized as one of only 50 lawyers qualified as a Board-Certified Expert in the area of aviation law, Tim specializes in transactional and regulatory matters related to the ownership, maintenance, and utilization of aircraft, airports, and airspace. Click here to read Tim’s full attorney biography.