By Adriana Bosco

Most people are familiar with defamation per se, where a statement is so obviously and materially harmful to a plaintiff that injury to an individual’s reputation is presumed. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559. But not all defamatory statements fit into the per se categories. When statements fall outside the narrow scope of per se claims, plaintiffs must proceed under a theory of defamation per quod. Unlike defamation per se, per quod claims come with a higher burden that presents an opportunity to challenge the sufficiency of a claim in the early stages of litigation.

A defamation per quod claim can arise in two situations. First, where the defamatory character of the statement is not apparent on its face and extrinsic circumstances are necessary to demonstrate a statement’s injurious meaning. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 1734 Ill. 2d 77, 102 (1996). Second, where a statement is defamatory on its face, but it does not fall within one of the limited categories of statements that are actionable as defamation per se. Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 76 Ill.App.2d 154, 158-60 (1996).

In any defamation per quod claim, a plaintiff must plead and prove special damages to recover. A per quod claim requires allegations of specific facts that establish plaintiffs’ special damages. Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 416 (1996). General allegations, such as general statements of damage to an individual’s health or reputation, economic loss, and emotional distress, are insufficient to support an action for defamation per quod. Schaffer v. Zekman, 196 Ill.App.3d 727, 733 (1990). Illinois courts have consistently held that vague or speculative claims of harm are insufficient to state a claim for defamation per quod. See e.g., Schaffer, 196 Ill.App.3d at 733 (allegations of extreme emotional distress and the inability to participate in normal activities are insufficient to establish special damages); Anderson, 172 Ill. 2d at 416 (allegations that the plaintiff “suffered great mental pain and anguish and incurred great medical expense for the treatment thereof” are insufficient to plead special damages); Taradash v. Adelet/Scott – Fetzer Co., 260 Ill.App. 3d 313, 318 (1st Dist. 1993) (allegations of lost commissions and income are insufficient to establish special damages).

Illinois courts make clear that vague allegations that do not adequately identify a specific loss or fail to clearly tie the alleged defamatory statement to the harm alleged are insufficient to state a claim for defamation per quod.

While the strict pleading standard in defamation per quod claims presents a hurdle for plaintiffs, it serves as a strong defense tool to challenge per quod claims. If a plaintiff fails to meet this heightened pleading standard, defendants can move to dismiss claims early. And even if a claim for defamation per quod survives, the heightened standard allows defendants to focus early discovery on damages and pursue summary judgment if the plaintiff cannot substantiate their claimed losses. The special damages requirement places a significant burden on plaintiffs to plead and prove that they suffered actual, demonstrable harm.

About Adriana Bosco

Adriana is an associate in Tressler’s General Defense Litigation Practice Group. Adriana concentrates her practice in the areas of tort, personal injury, and premises liability. Adriana also works in the Condominium & Common Interest Community Association Practice Group. Her practice includes representing condominium associations and common interest community associations in a variety of areas. Adriana advises condominium associations of their rights and responsibilities under Illinois law. Click here to read Adriana’s full attorney bio.